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Abstract
In decision problems under incomplete information, payoff vectors (indexed by states of nature) and
beliefs are naturally paired by bilinear duality. We exploit this duality to analyze the value of information,
using concepts and tools from convex analysis. We then derive global estimates of the value of information
of any information structure from local properties of the value function and of the set of optimal actions
taken at the prior belief only. We apply our results to the marginal value of information at the null, that
is, when the agent is close to receiving no information at all.
Keywords: value of information, convex analysis, payoffs-beliefs duality.
AMS classification: 46N10, 91B06.
1 Introduction
The value of a piece of information to an economic agent depends on the information at hand, on the agent’s
prior on the state of nature, and on the decision problem faced. These elements are intrinsically tied, and
separating the influence of one of them from that of the others is not straightforward.
Most information rankings are either uniform among agents or restricted to certain classes of agents.
Blackwell’s comparison of experiments [8], for instance, is uniform; it states that an information structure is
more informative than another if all agents, no matter their available choices and preferences, weakly prefer
the former to the latter. Papers [26, 31, 12] are examples that build information rankings based on restricted
sets of decision problems. The flip side of this approach is that information rankings are silent as to the
dependency of the value of a fixed piece information on the agent’s preferences and available choices. They
do not tell us what makes information more or less valuable to an arbitrary agent, and neither can they
identify the agents who value a given piece of information more than others. If we want to answer this type
of questions, we need to examine carefully how information, priors, decisions and preferences come into play.
The effect of priors and evidence on beliefs is well understood. Given a prior belief, and after receiving
some information, an agent forms a posterior belief. Posterior beliefs average out to the prior belief, and
information acquisition can usefully be represented by the distribution of these posterior beliefs (see, e.g. [9,
3]).
In any decision problem, to each decision and state of nature corresponds a payoff. The decision problem
can thus be represented as a set of available vector payoffs, where each payoff is indexed by a state of nature
[7]. Given a posterior belief, the agent makes a decision that maximizes her expected utility so that, to
each (posterior) belief of the agent corresponds an expected utility at this belief. The corresponding map
from beliefs to expected payoffs is called the value function. The value of a piece of information, defined as
the difference in expected utilities from having or not having the information at hand, is thus the difference
between the expectation of the value function at the posterior and at the prior, and is nonnegative. Thus,
the value function fully captures the agent’s preferences for information.
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In this paper, we make use of convex analysis [33] to exploit a bilinear duality structure between payoffs
and beliefs, that gives expected payoff [17]. Primal variables are payoffs vectors, dual variables are beliefs
(or, more generally, signed measures) and the value function appears as the (restriction to beliefs) of the
support function of the set of available vector payoffs. This provides a correspondence between convex
analysis concepts and tools, on the one hand, and economic objects, on the other hand. The set of beliefs
compatible with an optimal action is related to the normal cone of the set of available vector payoff at this
optimal action. The subgradient of the value function at any belief can be represented as the set of optimal
choice of vector payoffs at this belief.
We express the value of information according to the influence it has on decisions. We provide three
upper and lower bounds on the value of information.
In the first upper and lower bounds, we characterize information with a positive value. We show that
information has a positive value if and only if at least one of the optimal actions at the prior becomes
suboptimal for some of the posteriors. We thus define the confidence set at a prior belief p¯ as the set of
posterior beliefs for which all optimal actions at p¯ remain optimal. Our result says that information has
positive value if and only if posterior beliefs fall outside of the confidence set with positive probability.
This result generalizes insights from [23] and [30], who had already noticed that information can only be
useful insofar as it influences choices. We provide corresponding lower and upper bounds to the value of
information.
In the second bounds, we express the fact that the value of information is maximal when it influences
actions the most, which happens when information breaks indifferences between several choices. We show
that, when this is the case, the value of information can be suitably measured by an expected distance
between the prior and the posterior. The optimal action is discontinuous at the prior, and information that
allows to break indifferences has highest value.
Finally, our third bounds apply to cases in which the agent’s optimal choice is a smooth function of her
belief around the prior. We show that, in this situation, the value function is also smooth around the prior,
and the value of information is essentially a quadratic function of the expected distance between the prior
and the posterior. In this intermediate case, information impacts actions in a continuous way. The optimal
actions at the prior belief and at a posterior close to it are themselves close, so choosing one instead of the
other has a mild - albeit positive - impact on the expected payoff.
In a finite decision problem such as shopping behavior [28] or residential location, [29], at any given prior
the agent either has an optimal action that is locally constant, or is indifferent between several optimal
choices. The first and second upper and lower bounds are particularly useful in finite choice problems. The
third bounds are most useful in decision problems with a continuum of choices, such as scoring rules [11] or
investment decisions [1].
The paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 presents the model and introduces the duality between ac-
tions/payoffs and beliefs. The main results are presented in Sect. 3. Sect. 4 is devoted to applications to
the question of marginal value of information, and Sect. 5 to an insurance example. Sect. 6 concludes by
discussing related literature. The Appendix contains background on convex analysis and the proofs.
2 Model, payoffs-beliefs duality and information
We consider the classical question of an agent who faces a decision problem under imperfect information on
a state of nature. The set of states of nature is a finite set K. We identify the set Σ of signed measures on K
with RK . The agent holds a prior belief p¯ with full support in the set ∆ = ∆(K) ⊂ Σ = RK of probability
distributions over K. We identify ∆ with the simplex of RK .
A decision problem is given by an arbitrary compact choice set D and by a continuous payoff func-
tion g : D × K → R. Consistent with the framework of [8], we define the set of actions as the compact
convex subspace of RK given by the closed convex hull :
A = co{(g(d, k))
k∈K
, d ∈ D} ⊂ RK . (1)
The convexity of A is justified by allowing the agent to randomize over actions.
2
Duality between payoffs and beliefs
The scalar product between a vector v ∈ RK and a signed measure s ∈ RK is 〈s , v〉 = ∑k∈K skvk. This
scalar product induces a duality between payoffs/actions and beliefs. Such a duality is at the core of a series
of works in nonexpected utility theory, such as [21, 27, 14].
Under belief p ∈ ∆, the decision maker chooses a decision d ∈ D that maximizes ∑k pkg(d, k), or,
equivalently, an action a ∈ A that maximizes 〈p , a〉, and the corresponding expected payoff is maxa∈A 〈p , a〉 ∈
R. We define the value function vA : ∆→ R by:
vA(p) = max
a∈A
〈p , a〉 , ∀p ∈ ∆ . (2)
The value function vA : ∆→ R is convex — as the supremum of the family of affine functions 〈· , a〉 for a ∈ A
— and continuous — as its domain is the whole convex set ∆ [22, p. 175].
Given a belief p ∈ ∆, we let A⋆(p) ⊂ A be the set of optimal actions at belief p, given by
A⋆(p) = argmax
a′∈A
〈p , a′〉 = {a ∈ A | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈p , a′〉 ≤ 〈p , a〉} . (3)
Geometrically, the set A⋆(p) is the (exposed) face of A in the direction p ∈ ∆ (see (26) in Appendix for a
proper definition). The set A⋆(p) is nonempty, closed, convex (as A is convex and compact).
Conversely, an outside observer can make inferences on the agent’s beliefs from observed actions. For an
action a ∈ A, the set ∆⋆A(a) of beliefs revealed by action a is the set of all beliefs for which a is an optimal
action, given by:
∆⋆A(a) = {p ∈ ∆ | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈p , a′〉 ≤ 〈p , a〉} . (4)
Geometrically, the set ∆⋆A(a) is the intersection with ∆ of the normal cone NA(a) (see (29) for a proper
definition).
Obviously, given a ∈ A and p ∈ ∆, a ∈ A⋆(p) iff p ∈ ∆⋆A(a), as both express that action a is optimal
under belief p.
Information structure
We follow [9, 8], and we describe information through a distribution of posterior beliefs that average to the
prior belief. Hence, given the prior belief p¯, we define an information structure as a random variable q,
defined over a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and with values in ∆, describing the agent’s posterior beliefs, and
such that (where E denotes the expectation operator with respect to P)
q : (Ω,F ,P)→ ∆ , E [q] = p¯ . (5)
Given the action set A in (1) and the information structure q in (5), the value of information VoIA(q)
is the difference between the expected payoff for an agent who receives information according to q and one
whose prior belief is p¯. It is given by:
VoIA(q) = E
[
vA(q)
] − vA(p¯) . (6)
The following example illustrates relations between the set A of actions and the value function vA.
Example 1 Consider two states of nature, K = {1, 2}, decisions D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, and payoffs given by
Table 1. In this case, A is the convex hull of the four points (3, 0), (2, 2), (0, 5/2) and (0, 0). The value
function vA expressed as a function of the probability p of state 2 is the maximum of the following three affine
functions: 3(1 − p), 2, and 5p/2. Action (3, 0) is optimal for p ≤ 1/3, (2, 2) is optimal for p ∈ [1/3, 4/5],
and (0, 3/2) is optimal for p ≥ 4/5. Both the set A and the function vA are represented in Figure 1.
At p = 4/5, the optimal actions are (2, 2), (0, 5/2), and their convex combinations. At this point, the
mapping vA is not differentiable. However, its subgradient — which can be visualized as the set of straight
lines that are below vA and tangent to it at p = 4/5 — is still well defined and corresponds precisely to the
optimal actions A⋆(4/5), i.e. the convex hull of {(0, 5/2), (3, 3)}.
3
k = 1 k = 2
d1 3 0
d2 2 2
d3 0 5/2
d4 0 0
Table 1: Table of payoffs
A
0
1
2
3
0 1 2 3
b
b
b
p = 1/3
∆⋆A(3, 0)
b
b
b
0
1
2
3
0 1
1
2
3
p
State 1 State 2
∆⋆A(3, 0)
A⋆(4/5)
Figure 1: The set A on the left and the function vA on the right. Each of the four arrows on the left
represents an action a such that p = 4/5 belongs to the set ∆⋆A(a) of beliefs revealed by action a. On the
right side, these four actions (each attached to an arrow) can be seen as four elements of the subgradient
of the value function vA at p = 4/5. The set ∆
⋆
A(3, 0) = [0, 1/3] can be visualized both as the normal cone
at (3, 0) on the left side and as the range of values of probabilities p for which (3, 0) is optimal on the right.
The set ∆⋆A(3, 3) of beliefs revealed by action (3, 3) consists of the range p ∈ [4/5, 1], and it can be seen
on the right side of Figure 1 that, for this range of probabilities, the action (3, 0) is optimal and that vA is
linear and equal to 3(1− p).
3 On the value of information
In this section, we relate the geometry of the set A of actions in (1) both with the behavior of the agent
around the prior belief p¯, with differentiability properties of the value function vA in (2) at the prior belief p¯,
and with the value of information VoIA in (6). This approach allows us to derive bounds on the value of
information that depend on how information influences actions.
First, in Subsect. 3.1, we consider information that does not allow us to eliminate optimal actions. We
introduce the confidence set as the set of posterior beliefs at which all optimal actions at the prior remain
optimal. We show that information is valuable if and only if, with positive probability, it can lead to a
posterior outside this set. Therefore, information is valuable whenever it allows to eliminate some actions
from the set of optimal ones.
Second, in Subsect. 3.2, we consider the somewhat opposite case of tie-breaking information. This
corresponds to situations in which the agent is indifferent between several actions, and the information
allows her to select among them. We show that the value of information can be related to an expected
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distance between the prior and the posterior, provided that posterior beliefs move in these tie-breaking
directions.
These two first approaches are suitable in finite decision problems where the value function is piecewise
linear. In the third approach, in Subsect. 3.3, we look at situations in which the optimal action is locally
unique around the prior and depends on information in a continuous and smooth way. There, we show that
the value of information can essentially be measured as an expected square distance from the prior to the
posterior. This approach is particularly adapted to cases in which the space of actions is sufficiently rich,
and where small changes of beliefs lead to corresponding small changes of actions.
3.1 Valuable information
Our first task is to formalize the idea that useful information is information that affects optimal choices
(quoting [23], “Information is of value only if it can affect action”). Since there are potentially several
optimal actions at a prior belief p¯ and at a posterior p, there are in principle many ways to formalize this
idea.
We say that a belief p is in the confidence set ∆cA(p¯) of prior belief p¯ iff all optimal actions at p¯ are also
optimal at p. In other words, we define the confidence set of prior belief p¯ by:
∆cA(p¯) =
⋂
a∈A⋆(p¯)
∆⋆A(a) . (7)
Another way to look at this notion is to consider an observer who sees choices by the decision maker:
p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) when none of the actions chosen by the agent at prior belief p¯ would lead the observer to refute
the possibility that the agent has belief p.
The notion of a confidence set allows for the characterization of valuable information as follows.
Proposition 2 (Valuable information)
VoIA(q) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃a⋆ ∈ A⋆(p¯) , a⋆ ∈ A⋆(q) , P− a.s. (8a)
⇐⇒ q ∈ ∆cA(p¯) , P− a.s. (8b)
In Example 1, the confidence set at p¯ = 1/2 is the closed interval [1/2, 3/4]. Information is valuable
whenever, with some positive probability, the posterior does not belong to this set. When the posterior falls
in this set with probability one, it is easy to see that the value function averaged at the prior precisely equals
the value at prior belief p¯, hence information has no value.
It is relatively straightforward to see that if all posteriors remain in the confidence set, information is
valueless. In fact, when this is the case, the same action is optimal for all of the posteriors, which means
that the agent can play this action, while ignoring the new information, and obtain the same value. The
proposition shows that the converse result also holds: the value of information is positive whenever posteriors
fall outside of the confidence set with some positive probability.
More can be said about estimates on the value of information. To do so, we introduce an ε-neighborhood
of the confidence set ∆cA(p¯). For ε > 0, let
∆cA,ε(p¯) = {q ∈ ∆ | d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
)
< ε} where d(q,∆cA(p¯)) = inf
p∈∆cA(p¯)
‖p− q‖ . (9)
This leads us to a first estimate of the value of information.
Theorem 3 (Bound on the value of information based on confidence sets) For every ε > 0, there
exist positive constants CA and cp¯,A,ε such that, for every information structure q as in (5):
CAE
[
d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
)] ≥ VoIA(q) ≥ cp¯,A,εP{q 6∈ ∆cA,ε(p¯)} . (10)
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The upper bound tells us that the value of information is bounded by (a constant times) the expected
distance from the posterior to the confidence set at the prior. In particular, it is bounded by the expected
distance from the posterior to the prior itself. The lower bound is a converse result, but in which we need
to replace the confidence set by some ε-neighborhood. It shows us that the value of information is bounded
below by (a constant times) the probability that the posterior is at least distance ε from the confidence set,
and, therefore, it is also larger than the expected distance from the posterior to this ε-neighborhood of the
confidence set. Both the lower and upper bounds depend on the confidence set ∆cA(p¯) in (7), which can be
computed locally at prior belief p¯. On the other hand, they apply to all information structures. The caveat
is that the multiplicative constants CA and cp¯,A,ε in (10) depend on global, and not just local, properties of
the action set A.
3.2 Undecided
We now consider situations in which information influences actions the most. Those are situations of indif-
ference in which, at the prior belief p¯, the agent is undecided between several optimal actions. A small piece
of information can then be enough to break this indifference. As shown by the following proposition (whose
proof we do not give, as it is well-known in convex analysis [22, p. 251]), the value function then exhibits a
kink at prior belief p¯.
Proposition 4 The two following conditions are equivalent:
• the set A⋆(p¯) of optimal actions at the prior belief p¯ in (3) contains more than one element;
• the value function vA in (2) is nondifferentiable (in the standard sense) at the prior belief p¯.
Cases of indifference are typical of situations with a finite number of action choices. Coming back to
Example 1, the agent is undecided for p¯ = 1/2 and p¯ = 3/4: at these priors, the agent has several optimal
choices, and the value function is nondifferentiable. At all other priors, the optimal choice is unique, and
the value function is differentiable.
At prior beliefs p¯ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 4, the convexity gap of the value function vA
is maximal in the directions in which it is nondifferentiable. This allows us to derive a second bound on the
value of information. For this purpose, we call indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) at prior belief p¯ the vector space of
signed measures
ΣiA(p¯) = [A
⋆(p¯)−A⋆(p¯)]⊥ . (11)
Beliefs in the indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) do not break any of the ties in A
⋆(p¯), since p ∈ ΣiA(p¯) ⇐⇒ 〈p , a〉 =
〈p , a′〉 , ∀(a, a′) ∈ A⋆(p¯)2. We note the inclusion ∆cA(p¯) ⊂ ΣiA(p¯) ∩ ∆ as every element in the confidence
set is necessarily in the indifference kernel and in the simplex of probability measures.
Recall that a semi-norm on the signed measures Σ onK, identified with RK , is a mapping ‖·‖ : RK → R+
which satisfies the requirements of a norm, except that the vector subspace {s ∈ RK | ‖s‖ = 0}— called the
kernel of the semi-norm ‖ · ‖ — is not necessarily reduced to the null vector.
Theorem 5 (Bounds on the value of information for the undecided agent) There exists a positive
constant CA and a semi-norm ‖ · ‖Σi
A
(p¯) with kernel Σ
i
A(p¯), the indifference kernel in (11), such that, for
every information structure q as in (5):
CAE ‖q− p¯‖ ≥ VoIA(q) ≥ VoIA⋆(p¯)(q) ≥ E ‖q− p¯‖Σi
A
(p¯) . (12)
For p¯ = 1/2 or p¯ = 3/4 in Example 1, Theorem 5 shows that the value of information for these priors is
bounded above and below by a constant times the norm-1 between the prior and the posterior. Since any
small amount of information allows to break the indifference between the optimal actions at these priors,
information is very valuable.
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The lower bound in Theorem 5 shows that a lower bound of the value of information is the expectation
of a semi-norm of the distance between the prior belief and the posterior belief. To understand the role
of the kernel ΣiA(p¯) of this semi-norm, let us first consider the set of beliefs in this set. A posterior q is
in ΣiA(p¯) = [A
⋆(p¯) − A⋆(p¯)]⊥ if and only if, for any two optimal actions a, a′ ∈ A⋆(p¯), 〈q , a〉 = 〈q , a′〉. In
words, posteriors that do not break any of the ties in A⋆(p¯) might not be valuable to the agent. On the other
hand, Theorem 5 tells us that all other directions — i.e., those that allow at least one of the ties in A⋆(p¯)
to be broken — are valuable to the agent, and furthermore, in these directions, the value of information
behaves like an expected distance from the prior to the posterior.
The upper bound says that the value of information is bounded by an expected distance from the prior
to the posterior, and the inner inequality states that the value of information with decision set A is at least
as large as with action set A⋆(p¯).
Note that the bounds on Theorem 5 rely on the indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) in (11), which can be computed
directly from the set A⋆(p¯) by (11). The multiplicative constant CA in (12), however, depends on more
global properties of the action set A.
3.3 Flexible
Finally, we consider the case in which there is a unique optimal action for each belief in the range considered,
and this action depends smoothly on the belief. More precisely, we assume that around the prior, optimal
actions smoothly depend on a 1-1 way on the belief. This assumption is met when, for instance, the decision
problem faced by the agent is a scoring rule [11], or an investment problem [1, 12].
Our first step is to characterize a class of situations of interest, in which the agent’s optimal action
depends smoothly on her belief. The following proposition offers three alternative characterizations of these
situations, based 1) on the local behavior of the agent’s optimal optimal choices, 2) on local properties of
the geometry of the boundary of the set of actions, and 3) on local second differentiability properties of the
value function. For background on geometric convex analysis, the reader can consult §A.2 in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the action set A in (1) has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold of RK of
dimension |K| − 1. The three following conditions are equivalent:
1. The set-valued mapping of optimal actions at the prior belief p¯ in (3)
A⋆ : ∆⇒ ∂A , p 7→ A⋆(p) (13)
is a local diffeomorphism1 at the prior belief p¯;
2. The set A⋆(p¯) of optimal actions at the prior belief p¯ in (3) is reduced to a singleton at which the
curvature of the action set A is positive;
3. The value function vA in (2) is twice differentiable at the prior belief p¯, with positive definite Hessian
at p¯.
In this case, we say that the agent is flexible at p¯.
Theorem 7 (Bounds on the VoI for the flexible agent) If the agent is flexible at prior belief p¯, then
there exist positive constants Cp¯,A and cp¯,A such that, for every information structure q as in (5):
Cp¯,AE ||q− p¯||2 ≥ VoIA(q) ≥ cp¯,AE ||q− p¯||2 . (14)
Theorem 7 shows that, in the case of a flexible agent, the value of information is essentially given by the
expected square distance between the prior and the posterior, up to some multiplicative constant. One of the
strengths of the theorem is that its assumption that the agent is flexible is a local one, whereas its conclusion
is global, as it applies to all information structures. On the other hand, the multiplicative constants Cp¯,A and
cp¯,A in (14) themselves depend on the global behavior of the value function, and hence cannot be inferred
from local properties only.
1In particular, the set A⋆(p) is a singleton for all p ∈ ∆, in which case we identify a singleton set with its single element.
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4 The marginal value of information
The question of the marginal value of information is studied in [32]. They provide joint conditions on
a parameterized family of information structures together with a decision problem such that, when the
agent is close to receiving no information at all, the marginal value of information is null. Their result was
subsequently generalized in [15] and [16], where are provided joint conditions on parameterized information
and a decision problem leading to zero marginal value of information.
In this Section, we show how our bounds on the value of information apply to the marginal value of
information. In Subsect. 4.1, we provide separate conditions on the decision problem and on the family
of parameterized information structures that result in a null value of information. We then examine, in
Subsect. 4.2, several parameterized families of information structures and rely on our main results to study
how the marginal value of information varies depending on the decision problem faced.
4.1 Model and first result
Let (qθ)θ>0 be a family of information structures as in (5). As in [32], we are interested in the so-called
marginal value of information:
V + = lim sup
θ→0
1
θ
VoIA(q
θ) . (15)
The following proposition is a straightforward consequence of Theorems 3 and 7.
Proposition 8 Assume that
• either E [d(qθ,∆cA(p¯))] = o(θ),
• or the decision maker is flexible at prior belief p¯ and E ‖qθ − p¯‖2 = o(θ).
Then the marginal value of information V + = 0.
The first condition is met automatically if E ‖qθ − p¯‖ = o(θ). It is also met if, for instance, ∆cA(p¯) has a
nonempty interior, and posteriors converge to the prior almost surely.
We now discuss how our approach in Proposition 8 compares with the literature. In [32], one finds joint
conditions on the parameterized information structure (qθ)θ>0 and the decision problem at hand, leading to
V + = 0. The second case in Proposition 8, when the decision maker is flexible, compares with the original
Radner-Stiglitz assumptions for the smoothness part, but not for the uniqueness of optimal actions. Indeed,
Assumption (A0) in [32] does not require that A⋆(qθ) be a singleton, for all θ.
The authors of [15] make a step towards disentangling conditions on the parameterized information
structure (qθ)θ>0 from conditions on the decision problem that lead to a null marginal value of information.
However, like [32], they make an assumption on how the optimal action varies with information, which makes
the comparison with Proposition 8 delicate. In addition, [15] provide sufficient conditions for V + = 0 that
bear on the conditional distribution of the signal knowing the state of nature. Our approach focuses on the
posterior conditional distribution of the state of nature knowing the signal.
The authors of [16] provide separate conditions on the parameterized information structure (qθ)θ>0 and
the decision problem (represented by the action set A) that lead to V + = 0. Their condition “IIDV=0”
is that lim supθ→0
1
θ
E ‖qθ − p¯‖ = 0, or, equivalently, E ‖qθ − p¯‖ = o(θ), which implies the first item of
Proposition 8. Thus, this latter proposition implies the main result of [16].
4.2 Examples
Here, we study the marginal value of information for several typical parameterized information structures.
In the first example, information consists on the observation of a Brownian motion with known variance and
a drift that depends on the state of nature. In the second example, information consists of the observation
of a Poisson process whose probability of success depends on the state of nature. In these two well studied
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families in the learning literature, the natural parameterization of information is the length of the interval
of time during which observation takes place. In the third example, the agent observes a binary signal and
the marginal value of information depends on the asymptotic informativeness of these signals close to the
situation without information.
In all three following examples we assume binary states of nature, K = {0, 1}, and (by a slight abuse of
notation) the prior belief on the state being 1 is denoted p¯ ∈]0, 1[. We follow the conditions in Sect. 3 under
which we established bounds on the value of information, and label as: “confident” the case in which p¯ lies
in the interior of ∆cA(p¯) (in this case, ∆
c
A(p¯) is a closed nonempty interval
[
pl, ph
]
by Proposition 17, and
the value function is linear on this range); “undecided” the case in which the decision problem faced by the
decision maker is such that there is indifference between two actions at prior belief p¯; “flexible” the case in
which the optimal action is a smooth function of the belief in a neighborhood of prior belief p¯.
Our aim is to develop estimates of the marginal value of information V + in (15). There are three
possibilities: it can be infinite, null, or positive and finite. We denote these three cases by V + =∞, V + = 0
and V + ≃ 1 respectively.
Example 9 (Brownian motion) Frameworks in which agents observe a Brownian motion with known
volatility and unknown drift include [5, 24, 10], as well as reputation models like [19].
Assume the agent observes the realization of a Brownian motion with variance 1 and drift k ∈ {0, 1},
namely dZt = kdt+ dBt, for a small interval of time θ > 0. If we let q
t be the posterior belief at time t, it
is well-known2 that qt follows a diffusion process of the form dqt = qt(1 − qt)dwt, where w is a standard
Browian process. Thus, for small values of θ, we have the estimates
E ‖qθ − p‖ ∼
√
θ , E ‖qθ − p‖2 ∼ θ .
It follows from Theorems 3-7 that the marginal value of information is characterized, depending on the
decision problem, as:
1. In the confident case, V + = 0,
2. In the undecided case, V + =∞,
3. In the flexible case, V + ≃ 1.
Example 10 (Poisson learning) An important class of models of strategic experimentation (see [25]) are
those in which the agent’s observations are driven by a Poisson process of unknown intensity. Assume the
agent observes, during a small interval of time θ > 0, a Poisson process with intensity ρk, k ∈ {0, 1},
where ρ1 > ρ0 > 0. The probability of two successes is negligible compared to the probability of one success
(of order θ2 compared to θ). A success leads to a posterior that converges from below, as θ → 0, to
q+ =
p¯ρ1
p¯ρ1 + (1− p¯)ρ0 > p¯ ,
and happens with probability of order ∼ θ. In the absence of success, the posterior belief converges to
the prior belief p¯ as θ → 0. As ∆cA(p¯) =
[
pl, ph
]
, we note that E
[
d
(
qθ,∆cA(p¯)
)] ∼ θ if q+ > ph, and
E
[
d
(
qθ,∆cA(p¯)
)]
= o(θ) otherwise. This implies:
1. In the confident case,
(a) V + ≃ 1 if q+ > ph,
(b) V + ≃ 0 if q+ ≤ ph.
We also have the estimates
E ‖qθ − p‖ ∼ θ , E ‖qθ − p‖2 ∼ θ ,
which imply the following estimates on the marginal value of information:
2See for instance Lemma 1 in [10] or Lemma 2 in [19].
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2. In the undecided case, V + ≃ 1,
3. In the flexible case, V + ≃ 1.
Example 11 (Equally likely signals) Here, we consider binary and equally likely signals, which lead to
a “split” of beliefs around the prior belief p¯. Depending on the precision of these signals as a function of θ,
the posterior beliefs are p± θα for a certain parameter α > 0 (lower values of α correspond to more spread
out beliefs around the prior, hence to more accurate information). In this case we easily compute
E ‖qθ − p‖ = θα , E ‖qθ − p‖2 = θ2α ,
and we observe that E
[
d(qθ,∆cA(p¯)
]
= 0 for θ small enough. Here again, the marginal value of information
is deduced from Theorems 3–7:
1. In the confident case, V + = 0,
2. In the undecided case,
(a) V + =∞ if α < 1,
(b) V + ≃ 1 if α = 1,
(c) V + = 0 if α > 1,
3. In the flexible case,
(a) V + =∞ if α < 1/2,
(b) V + ≃ 1 if α = 1/2,
(c) V + = 0 if α > 1/2.
Table 2 summarizes the marginal value of information in all of our examples.
Marginal value of information V + confident undecided flexible
Brownian 0 ∞ 1
Poisson learning 0 or 1 1 1
Equally likely signals, α < 1/2 0 ∞ ∞
Equally likely signals, α = 1/2 0 ∞ 1
Equally likely signals, 1/2 < α < 1 0 ∞ 0
Equally likely signals, α = 1 0 1 0
Equally likely signals, α > 1 0 0 0
Table 2: Marginal value of information in the different examples. The value 1 represents a positive and finite
marginal value of information.
In all cases except one, the marginal value of information is completely determined by the local behavior
of the value function around the prior. For the Poisson case, the marginal value of information is 0 or
positive, depending on whether the observation of a success is sufficient to lead to a decision reversal.
The marginal value of information is always weakly lower in the flexible case than in the undecided case,
and weakly higher in the undecided case than in other cases. In the confident case, the marginal value of
information is null, except in the Poisson case with q+ > ph. This is driven by the fact that, in all other cases,
posteriors are, with high probability, too close to the prior to lead to a decision reversal. In the undecided
situation, the marginal value of information is always positive or infinite, except for sufficiently uninformative
binary signals (α > 1). Finally, in the flexible case, the most representative of decision problems with a
continuum of actions, the value of information is positive or infinite, except with quite uninformative binary
signals (α > 1/2).
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5 An insurance example
In this example, we study an insurance problem and illustrate how the results of Sect. 3 apply. The insuree
chooses whether to insure, or not, at which indemnity level to insure if she does. The uncertainty is about
the level of risk she incurs, and she may receive some partial information about it.
Example 12 The model is drawn from the classical insurance framework (see [6, 18]).
An insuree faces the decision of partially or fully insuring a good of value ̟ against the possibility of its
total loss. Pricing is assumed to be linear, so that, for an indemnity I, the insurance company charges
P (I) = αI + f where α ∈]0, 1[ , f > 0 . (16)
In exchange for the premium P (I), the insuree gets compensation of an amount I from the insurance company
in case of a loss. For the range of wealth w considered, the insuree’s utility function u is considered to have
constant absolute risk aversion R, that is,
u(w) = 1− e−Rw . (17)
By (1), the set of actions is the closed convex hull
A = co
{(
u(̟), u(0)
)
,
(
u
(− P (I) +̟), u(− P (I) + I))} (18)
where, by convention, the first coordinate corresponds to no loss and the second corresponds to the loss.
The insuree’s subjective perception that a loss may arise is p ∈]0, 1[, probability of loss. The insuree
chooses either not to insure, and obtains expected utility
U0(p) = (1− p)u(̟) + pu(0) = (1− p)
(
1− e−R̟) , (19a)
or to insure for an indemnity I > 0 that maximizes the expected utility
U(p, I) = (1− p)u(− P (I) +̟)+ pu(− P (I) + I) = 1− pe−R
(
−P (I)+I
)
− (1− p)e−R
(
−P (I)+̟
)
. (19b)
The question now becomes whether no insurance or a positive level of indemnity is chosen.
Proposition 13 There exists a threshold belief p∗ ∈]0, 1[ and a smooth function Iˆ : [p∗, 1] →]0,+∞[ such
that
1. for p < p∗, it is optimal not to insure,
2. for p = p∗, the insuree is indifferent between no insurance and insurance at the positive indemnity
level Iˆ(p∗),
3. for p > p∗, it is optimal to insure at the positive indemnity level Iˆ(p).
Proof. It is easy to see that the function I ∈ R 7→ U(p, I) in (19b) is strictly concave with a unique maximum,
characterized by ∂U/∂I = 0, and achieved at
Iˆ(p) = ̟ −
1
R
ln(
1− p
p
α
1− α
) , ∀p ∈]0, 1[ . (20)
We denote by pˆ the unique p ∈]0, 1[ such that Iˆ(p) > 0 ⇐⇒ p > pˆ. To determine whether no insurance or a
nonnegative level of indemnity is chosen, we introduce the difference of expected utilities
δ(p) = max
I≥0
U(p, I)− U0(p) =
{
U(p, 0) − U0(p) if p ≤ pˆ ,
U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)
− U0(p) if p ≥ pˆ .
(21)
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We study the behavior of the function δ when p is small and when p is close to one. After computation, we find that,
for all p ∈ [0, 1] , U(p, 0) − U0(p) = −
(
eRf − 1
)(
p + (1 − p)e−R̟
)
< 0. Therefore, δ(p) < 0 for all p ≤ pˆ. On the
other hand, when p goes to 1, δ(p) goes to 1 because U0(p) → 0 and U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)
= (1 − p)
(
1− e−R
(
−P (Iˆ(p))+̟
))
+
p
(
1 − e−R
(
−P (Iˆ(p))+Iˆ(p)
))
= 1 − (1 − p)
(
1−p
p
α
1−α
)α
eR(1−α)̟ − p
(
1−p
p
α
1−α
)1−α
e−R(1−α)̟ → 1 (as α ∈]0, 1[). As a
consequence, we can define p∗ = inf {p ∈ [0, 1] | δ(p) > 0}, which belongs to [pˆ, 1[. Indeed, since δ(p) < 0 for p ≤ pˆ,
we deduce that p∗ ≥ pˆ; and p∗ < 1 because δ(p)→ 1 when p→ 1. We now check that p∗ and Iˆ in (20) satisfy the
three assertions of the Proposition.
By definition of p∗ and of the function δ, for p < p∗, it is optimal not to insure.
As the function δ is continuous, we have δ(p∗) = 0 and the insuree is indifferent between no insurance and
insurance at the positive indemnity level Iˆ(p∗).
To finish, we will now show that δ(p) > 0 when p > p∗, leading to the conclusion that it is optimal to insure at
the positive indemnity level Iˆ(p). Indeed, for p > p∗, we have
δ(p) = δ(p)− δ(p∗) as δ(p∗) = 0
= U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)
− U
(
p, Iˆ(p∗)
)
+ U
(
p, Iˆ(p∗)
)
− U0(p)−
[
U
(
p∗, Iˆ(p∗)
)
− U0(p
∗)
]
by (21)
> U
(
p, Iˆ(p∗)
)
− U0(p)− U
(
p∗, Iˆ(p∗)
)
+ U0(p
∗) as U
(
p, Iˆ(p)
)
− U
(
p, Iˆ(p∗)
)
> 0
by definition of the maximizer Iˆ(p) and since Iˆ(p) > Iˆ(p∗) ≥ 0 as p > p∗ ≥ pˆ
= (1− p)
[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟
)
− u(̟)
]
+ p
[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗)
)
− u(0)
]
− (1− p∗)
[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟
)
− u(̟)
]
− p∗
[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗)
)
− u(0)
]
by (19)
= (p− p∗)
[[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗)
)
− u(0)
]
+
[
u(̟)− u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟
)]]
≥ 0
since both terms between inner brackets are increments of the increasing function u, where −P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗) ≥ 0
(to be seen below) and P (Iˆ(p∗)) ≥ 0 (because Iˆ(p∗) ≥ 0). If we had −P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗) < 0, we would arrive at the
contradiction that 0 = δ(p∗) = (1− p∗)
[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) +̟
)
− u(̟)
]
+ p∗
[
u
(
− P (Iˆ(p∗)) + Iˆ(p∗)
)
− u(0)
]
< 0 since
both terms between brackets are (negative) increments of the increasing function u. ✷
Now, we assume that the insuree has access to a small piece of information concerning her probability
of loss. Once informed, she discovers that the probability q of a loss is either p − ε or p + ε, where both
possibilities are equally likely and ε > 0 is a small positive number. Let v(q) be the utility of the insuree
with beliefs q, once the optimal policy is chosen:
v(q) = max
{
U0(q),max
I≥0
U(q, I)
}
. (22)
As v is the value function in (2), the value of information in the decision problem is defined as the expected
utility with the information minus the expected utility absent the information, as in (6):
VoI(ε) =
1
2
v(p+ ε) +
1
2
v(p− ε)− v(p) . (23)
Note that VoI(ε) measures the value of information in terms of utility; the equivalent measure in monetary
terms would be − 1
R
ln(1 −VoI(ε)). The following proposition characterizes the value of a small amount of
information, in terms of the agent’s optimal insurance behavior.
Proposition 14 Depending on the probability of loss p, the value of information for small ε behaves as
follows:
1. In the confident case, for p < p∗, VoI(ε) = 0 for small ε,
2. In the undecided case, for p = p∗, VoI(ε) ∼ C∗ε for a constant C∗ > 0,
3. In the flexible case, for p > p∗, VoI(ε) ∼ C(p)ε2 for a constant C(p) > 0.
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Figure 2: The set A on the left and the corresponding value function v = vA in (22) for the insurance
example on the right. Parameter values are α = 0.08, f = 10, ̟ = 1000, R = 10.
Proof. The confident and undecided cases are immediate consequences of Theorems 3 and 5, together with
Proposition 13. In the flexible case, the optimal indemnity level is given by Iˆ(p) > 0, and the function Iˆ :]p∗, 1] →
]0,+∞[ in (20) is differentiable with dIˆ(p)
dp
6= 0. The set of optimal actions A⋆(p) in (3) is reduced to the single point
A⋆(p) =
(
1−e−R
(
−P
(
Iˆ(p)
)
+̟)
)
, 1−e−R
(
−P
(
Iˆ(p)
)
+Iˆ(p)
))
. As the curve p ∈]p∗, 1] 7→ A⋆(p) has a derivative that never
vanishes, we deduce that it is a local diffeomorphism (onto its image in ∂A) at p, and Theorem 7 applies. ✷
The results of Proposition 13 are intuitive. First, a small piece of information is valueless if the agent
is not buying insurance. For such agents, a small bit of information does not affect behavior, as even bad
news is not enough to trigger insurance purchase. For an undecided agent who is indifferent between no
insurance and insurance at a positive indemnity level I(p∗), a small piece of information is enough to break
the indifference and significantly influences her behavior, and this is the situation in which information is
the most valuable. Finally, for an agent who takes a positive level of indemnity, information may affect the
level of indemnity chosen. But, because the change of indemnity level is itself of order ε, and the indemnity
level I(p∗) is ε-optimal at the posterior, the value of information is a second order in ε.
Figure 2 represents the set A of actions (18) to the left, and the corresponding value function v = vA
in (22) to the right. In the representation of A, the horizontal axis corresponds to the payoff without loss,
and the vertical axis to the payoff in case of a loss. The circled dot to the right corresponds to the choice of
no insurance; it maximizes payoff in case of no loss. The thick curve represents the set of payoffs that are
achieved by different coverage levels. Finally, A is the convex hull of this set of points; it appears under the
dashed contour. As seen on the value function graph, for low values of the probability p of loss, the value
function is linear as the insuree chooses not to purchase insurance. At p∗ (which is approximately 0.334), the
value function exhibits a kink, and the agent is indifferent between no insurance and a positive indemnity
level. Finally, for larger values of p, the value function v is twice continuously differentiable with a positive
second derivative.
6 Related literature
The value of information in decision problems is a well-studied question in economics and in statistics. The
central work in this area is [8], which defines a source of information α as more informative than another, β,
whenever all agents, independently of their preferences and decision problems faced, weakly prefer α to β.
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Blackwell [8] characterizes precisely this relationship in the following terms: α is more informative than β if
and only if information from β can be obtained as a garbling of the information from α.
The requirement that all agents agree on their preferences between two statistical experiments is a strong
one. It implies that this ranking is incomplete, as many such pairs of experiments cannot be ranked according
to this ordering. Some authors have considered sub-classes of decision problems in order to obtain rankings
that are more complete than Blackwell’s. For instance, [26], [31] and [2] restrict attention to families of
decision problems that generate monotone decision rules. Focusing on investment decision problems, [12]
obtains and characterizes a complete ranking of information sources based on a uniform criterion; [13] use
a duality approach to characterize the value of an information purchase that consists of an information
structure with a price attached to it.
The present work departs from this literature in the sense that we focus on the value of information for
a given agent, instead of trying to measure the value of information independently of the agent. Papers [20]
and [4] characterize the possible preferences for information that any agent can have, letting the decision
problem vary and the agent’s preferences vary.
The question of marginal value of information is studied in [32, 15, 16]. They consider parameterized
information structures, and derive general conditions on the pair consisting of the information structures
and the decision problem under which the marginal value of information close to no information is zero. Our
work contributes to this question by allowing us to derive estimates on the value of information based on
separate conditions on the decision problem and on the information structure. This is the approach we have
taken in Sect. 4. Our contribution considerably opens the spectrum of possibilities for the marginal value of
information, by giving conditions under which it can be infinite, null, or positive and finite.
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A Appendix
A.1 Revisiting the model of Sect. 2
We revisit the model in Sect. 2 with convex analysis tools to prepare the proofs in Sect. A.3. We recall that
A ⊂ RK in (1) is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of RK , called the action set.
Support function The support function σA of the action set A is defined by
σA(s) = sup
a∈A
〈s , a〉 , ∀s ∈ Σ . (24)
The value function vA : ∆→ R in (2) is the restriction of σA to probability distributions ∆ = ∆(K) ⊂ Σ:
vA(p) = σA(p) , ∀p ∈ ∆ . (25)
It is well-known that σA is convex (as the supremum of the family of linear maps 〈· , a〉 for a ∈ A). As the
action set A is compact, σA(s) takes finite values, hence its domain is Σ, hence σA is continuous.
(Exposed) face For any signed measure s ∈ Σ, we let
FA(s) = argmax
a′∈A
〈s , a′〉 = {a ∈ A | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈s , a′〉 ≤ 〈s , a〉} ⊂ A (26)
be the set of maximizers of a 7→ 〈s , a〉 over A. We call FA(s) the (exposed) face of A in the direction s ∈ Σ.
As the action set A is convex and compact, the face FA(s) of A in the direction s is nonempty, for any s ∈ Σ,
and the face is a subset of the boundary ∂A of A: FA(s) ⊂ ∂A , ∀s ∈ Σ. We will use the following property:
for any nonempty convex set C ⊂ RK and y ∈ RK such that FC(y) 6= ∅, we have
σC(y
′)− σC(y) ≥ σFC(y)(y′ − y) ≥ 〈y′ − y , x′〉 , ∀y′ ∈ RK , ∀x′ ∈ C . (27)
The set A⋆(p) of optimal actions under belief p in (3) coincides with the (exposed) face FA(p) of A in the
direction p in (26):
A⋆(p) = FA(p) , ∀p ∈ ∆ . (28)
Normal cone For any payoff vector a in A, we define
NA(a) = {s ∈ Σ | ∀a′ ∈ A , 〈s , a′〉 ≤ 〈s , a〉} ⊂ Σ . (29)
We call NA(a) the normal cone to the closed convex set A at a ∈ A. Notice that NA(a) is made of signed
measures, that are not necessarily beliefs. The set ∆⋆A(a) of beliefs compatible with optimal action a in (4)
is related to the normal cone NA(a) at a in (29) by:
∆⋆A(a) = NA(a) ∩∆ , ∀a ∈ A . (30)
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Conjugate subsets of actions and beliefs Exposed face FA and normal cone NA are conjugate as
follows:
s ∈ Σ and a ∈ FA(s) ⇐⇒ a ∈ A and s ∈ NA(a) . (31)
A.2 Background on geometric convex analysis
A nonempty, convex and compact set A ⊂ RK is called a convex body of RK [34, p. 8].
Regular points and smooth bodies We say that a point a ∈ A is smooth or regular [34, p. 83] if the
normal cone NA(a) in (26) is reduced to a half-line. The set of regular points is denoted by reg(A):
a ∈ reg(A) ⇐⇒ ∃s ∈ Σ , s 6= 0 , NA(a) = R+s . (32)
Notice that a regular point a necessarily belongs to the boundary ∂A of A: reg(A) ⊂ ∂A. The body A is
said to be smooth if all boundary points of A are regular (reg(A) = ∂A); in that case, it can be shown that
its boundary ∂A is a C1 submanifold of RK [34, Theorem 2.2.4, p. 83].
Spherical image map of A We denote by S|K|−1 = {s ∈ Σ , ‖s‖ = 1} the unit sphere of the signed
measures Σ on K (identified with RK with its canonical scalar product). By (32), we have that a ∈
reg(A) ⇐⇒ ∃!s ∈ S|K|−1 , NA(a) = R+s. If a point a ∈ A is regular, the unique outer normal unitary
vector to A at a is denoted by nA(a), so that NA(a) = R+nA(a). The mapping
nA : reg(A)→ S|K|−1 , where reg(A) ⊂ ∂A , (33)
is called the spherical image map of A, or the Gauss map, and is continuous [34, p. 88]. We have
a ∈ reg(A)⇒ NA(a) = R+nA(a) where nA(a) ∈ S|K|−1 . (34)
Reverse spherical image map of A We say that a unit signed measure s ∈ S|K|−1 is regular [34, p. 87]
if the (exposed) face FA(s) of A in the direction s, as defined in (26), is reduced to a singleton. The set of
regular unit signed measures is denoted by regn(A):
s ∈ regn(A) ⇐⇒ s ∈ S|K|−1 and ∃!a ∈ A , FA(s) = {a} . (35)
For a regular unit signed measure s ∈ S|K|−1, we denote by fA(s) the unique element of FA(s), so that
FA(s) = {fA(s)}. The mapping
fA : regn(A)→ ∂A , where regn(A) ⊂ S|K|−1 , (36)
is called the reverse spherical image map of A, and is continuous [34, p. 88]. We have
s ∈ regn(A)⇒ FA(s) = {fA(s)} . (37)
Bodies with C2 surface
Proposition 15 (Schneider 2014, p. 113) If the body A has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold
of RK , then i) all points a ∈ ∂A are regular (reg(A) = ∂A), ii) the spherical image map nA in (33) is
defined over the whole boundary ∂A and is of class C1, iii) the spherical image map nA has the reverse
spherical image map fA in (33) as right inverse, that is, nA ◦ fA = Idregn(A).
Proof. The first two items can be found in [34, p. 113]. Now, we prove that nA ◦ fA = Idregn(A). As fA :
regn(A) → ∂A by (36), and as nA : ∂A → S
|K|−1 by (33) since reg(A) = ∂A, the mapping nA ◦ fA : regn(A) →
S|K|−1 is well defined. Let s ∈ regn(A). By (37), we have that FA(s) = {fA(s)} and by (34), we have that
NA
(
fA(s)
)
= R+nA
(
fA(s)
)
. From (31) — stating that exposed face and normal cone are conjugate — we deduce
that s ∈ R+nA(fA(s)). As s ∈ S
|K|−1, we conclude that s = nA
(
fA(s)
)
by (33). ✷
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Weingarten map Let a ∈ reg(A) be a regular point, as in (32), such that the spherical image map nA
in (33) is differentiable at a, with differential denoted by TanA. The Weingarten map [34, p. 113] TanA :
Ta∂A→ TnA(a)S|K|−1 linearly maps the tangent space Ta∂A of the boundary ∂A at point a into the tangent
space TnA(a)S
|K|−1 of the sphere S|K|−1 at nA(a). The eigenvalues of the Weingarten map at a are called
the principal curvatures of A at a [34, p. 114]; they are nonnegative [34, p. 115]. By definition, the body A
has positive curvature at a if all principal curvatures at a are positive or, equivalently, if the Weingarten
map is of maximal rank at a [34, p. 115].
Reverse Weingarten map Let s ∈ regn(A) be a regular unit signed measure such that the reverse spher-
ical image map fA in (36) is differentiable at s, with differential denoted by TsfA. The reverse Weingarten
map
TsfA : TsS
|K|−1 → TfA(s)∂A (38)
maps the tangent space TsS
|K|−1 of the sphere S|K|−1 at s into the tangent space TfA(s)∂A of the bound-
ary ∂A at point fA(s). The eigenvalues of the reverse Weingarten map at s are called the principal radii of
curvature of A at s.
A.3 Proofs of the results in Sect. 3
Using the relations (28) and (30), we express the proofs of the results in Sect. 3 in terms of the sets FA(p)
in (1) and NA(a) in (29) (in the set Σ of signed measures), instead of A
⋆(p) in (3) and ∆⋆A(a) in (4) (in the
set ∆ of probability measures).
Value of information We have seen in (25) that the value function vA : ∆→ R in (2) is the restriction
of the support function σA to beliefs in ∆. By definition (6) of the value of information, we deduce that, for
any information structure q as in (5), we have:
VoIA(q) = E [σA(q) − σA(p¯)] . (39)
Lemma 16 Let us introduce, for all q ∈ ∆,
ϕ+A(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) , (40a)
ϕ−A(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯)− σA⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) . (40b)
Then, for any information structure q and for any a ∈ A, we have that
E
[
ϕ+A(q)
]
= E
[
σA(q)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
(41a)
≥ VoIA(q) = E [σA(q) − σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉] (41b)
≥ E
[
σA(q)− σA(p¯)− σA⋆(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
= E
[
ϕ−A(q)
]
. (41c)
Proof. By (40), we have, for all q ∈ ∆,
ϕ+A(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) (42a)
= sup
a∈A⋆(p¯)
(
σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉
)
(42b)
≥ σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉 , ∀a ∈ A
⋆(p¯) (42c)
≥ inf
a∈A⋆(p¯)
(
σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉
)
(42d)
= σA(q)− σA(p¯)− σA⋆(p¯)(q − p¯) = ϕ
−
A(q) . (42e)
By taking the expectation, we obtain (41), using (39) and the property that E [q− p¯] = 0 in (5). ✷
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Confidence set and indifference kernel We start by providing characterizations of the confidence
set ∆cA(p¯) in (7) and of the indifference kernel Σ
i
A(p¯) in (11), in terms of the sets FA(p) in (26) and NA(a)
in (29).
Proposition 17
1. The confidence set ∆cA(p¯) of (7) is the nonempty closed and convex set
∆cA(p¯) =
⋂
a∈A⋆(p¯)
∆⋆A(a) =
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) ∩∆ . (43)
2. Let p ∈ ∆. We have that
p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) ⇐⇒ FA(p¯) ⊂ FA(p) (44a)
⇐⇒ σA(p)− σA(p¯)− 〈p− p¯ , a〉 = 0 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯) (44b)
⇐⇒ σA(p)− σA(p¯) + σ−A⋆(p)(p− p¯) = 0 . (44c)
3. The indifference kernel ΣiA(p¯) of (11) is the vector subspace
ΣiA(p¯) = [FA(p¯)− FA(p¯)]⊥ = [A⋆(p¯)−A⋆(p¯)]⊥ =
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NFA(p¯)(a) .
Proof.
1. Express (7) using (30).
2. We prove the three equivalences in (44).
(a) Let p ∈ ∆. Using the property (31) that exposed face FA and normal cone NA are conjugate,
we obtain: p ∈ ∆cA(p¯) ⇐⇒ p ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p)
NA(a) by (43)
⇐⇒ a ∈ FA(p) , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯) by (31) ⇐⇒ FA(p¯) ⊂ FA(p) .
(b) Let p ∈ ∆. We have that
σA(p)− σA(p¯)− 〈p− p¯ , a〉 = 0 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)
⇐⇒ σA(p) = 〈p , a〉 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)
(because σA(p¯) = 〈p¯ , a〉 for any a ∈ FA(p¯), since FA(p¯) is the set A
⋆(p) of optimal actions under prior belief p¯ by (3) and (26))
⇐⇒ p ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) (by definition (29) of NA(a))
⇐⇒ p ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) ∩∆ = ∆
c
A(p¯) by (43).
(c) For any a ∈ A, we define the function
ϕa(q) = σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q − p¯ , a〉 , ∀q ∈ ∆ . (45)
By (27) and (44b), we have that
∀a ∈ FA(p¯) , ∀q ∈ ∆ , ϕa(q) ≥ 0 , (46a)
∀a ∈ FA(p¯) , ∀q ∈ ∆
c
A(p¯) , ϕa(q) = 0 . (46b)
Let p ∈ ∆. Using (46a), we deduce from (44b) and from the compacity of FA(p¯) that p ∈ ∆
c
A(p¯) ⇐⇒
infa∈FA(p¯)
(
σA(p)− σA(p¯)− 〈p− p¯ , a〉
)
= 0. We conclude with (42d)–(42e).
3. Express (11) using (28). Then, use the definition of NFA(p¯)(a) in (29).
This ends the proof. ✷
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A.3.1 Valuable information
Proof.[Proof of Proposition 2]
Let a ∈ FA(p¯) and q be an information structure as in (5). We have that
VoIA(q) = 0 ⇐⇒ E [σA(q)− σA(p¯)] = 0 by (39)
⇐⇒ E [σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉] = 0 , as E [q− p¯] = 0
⇐⇒ σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉 = 0 , P− a.s.
(because σA(q)− σA(p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉 ≥ 0 by (27) since a ∈ FA(p¯))
⇐⇒ σA(q) = 〈q , a〉 , P− a.s. (because σA(p¯) = 〈p¯ , a〉 since a ∈ FA(p¯))
⇐⇒ P {a ∈ FA(q)} = 1
⇐⇒ P
{〈
q , a′ − a
〉
≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A
}
= 1 .
Let F ⊂ FA(p¯) be a dense subset of the compact FA(p¯) of R
K . We immediately get from the last equality that
VoIA(q) = 0 ⇒ P {〈q , a
′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F} = 1. As the set {a ∈ FA(p¯) | 〈q , a
′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A} is
closed (for any outcome in the underlying sample space Ω), we get that {〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F} ⊂{
〈q , a′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F
}
. We deduce from the last equality that VoIA(q) = 0⇒ P {〈q , a
′ − a〉 ≤ 0 ,
∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ F
}
= 1. Now, since F = FA(p¯), we finally get thatVoIA(q) = 0⇒ P {〈q , a
′ − a〉 ≤ 0 , ∀a′ ∈ A , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯)} = 1.
In other words, we have obtained that, by definition (29) of the normal cone NA(a): VoIA(q) = 0 ⇒ q ∈⋂
a∈FA(p¯)
NA(a) , P− a.s.. Since q ∈ ∆, we conclude by (43) that
VoIA(q) = 0⇒ q ∈
⋂
a∈FA(p)
NA(a) ∩∆ =
⋂
a∈A⋆(p)
∆⋆A(a) = ∆
c
A(p) .
Revisiting the proof backward, or using (44b), we easily see that q ∈ ∆cA(p) , P − a.s. ⇒ VoIA(q) = 0. This ends
the proof. ✷
Proof.[Proof of Theorem 3]
Let q be an information structure as in (5).
First, we show the upper estimate CAE d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
)
≥ VoIA(q) in (10). For this purpose, we consider a ∈ A and
we show that the function ϕa in (45) is such that
ϕa(q) ≤ sup
a′∈A
‖a− a′‖ inf
p∈∆c
A
(p¯)
‖p− q‖ . (49)
Indeed, we have that, for any p ∈ ∆cA(p¯),
ϕa(q) = ϕa(q)− ϕa(p) by (46b) since p ∈ ∆
c
A(p¯)
= σA(q)− σA(p)− 〈q − p , a〉 by (45)
= σA−a(q)− σA−a(p) by (24)
≤ sup
a′∈A−a
‖a′‖ × ‖p− q‖ by (24) = sup
a′∈A
‖a− a′‖ × ‖p− q‖ .
By taking the infimum with respect to all p ∈ ∆cA(p¯), we obtain (49). Then, we deduce that
VoIA(q) = E [ϕa(q)] , ∀a ∈ A by (41b)
= inf
a∈A
E [ϕa(q)] ≤ inf
a∈A
sup
a′∈A
‖a− a′‖ × E
[
inf
p∈∆c
A
(p¯)
‖p− q‖
]
by (49).
With CA = infa∈A supa′∈A ‖a − a
′‖ and (9), this gives the upper estimate CAE d
(
q,∆cA(p¯)
)
≥ VoIA(q) in (10).
Second, we show the lower estimate VoIA(q) ≥ cp¯,A,εP{q 6∈ ∆
c
A,ε(p¯)} in (10). We consider an open subset Q of ∆
that contains the confidence set ∆cA(p), that is, ∆
c
A(p¯) ⊂ Q. By Lemma 18 right below, there exists an a ∈ FA(p¯)
such that the continuous function ϕa in (45) is strictly positive on ∆
c
A(p¯)
c. As Qc ⊂ ∆cA(p¯)
c and Qc is a closed subset
of the compact ∆, we can define cp¯,A = infp 6∈Q ϕa(p) > 0. We deduce that
VoIA(q) = E [ϕa(q)] by (41b)
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= E
[
1q∈∆c
A
(p¯)ϕa(q) + 1q6∈∆c
A
(p¯)ϕa(q)
]
= E
[
1q6∈∆c
A
(p¯)ϕa(q)
]
by (46b)
≥ E [1q6∈Qϕa(q)] ≥ E [1q6∈Qcp¯,A] = cp¯,AP{q 6∈ Q} .
With Q = ∆cA,ε(p¯), we put cp¯,A,ε = infp 6∈∆cA,ε(p¯) ϕa(p) > 0.
This ends the proof. ✷
Lemma 18 There exists at least one a ∈ FA(p¯) such that the function ϕa in (45) is strictly positive on the
complementary set ∆cA(p¯)
c.
Proof. We consider two cases, depending whether FA(p¯) is a singleton or not.
Suppose that FA(p¯) is a singleton {a}. By (44b), we have that q 6∈ ∆
c
A(p¯) ⇐⇒ ϕa(q) > 0.
Suppose that FA(p¯) is a not singleton. Recall that the affine hull aff(⋐) of a subset ⋐ of R
K is the intersection of all
affine manifolds containing ⋐, and that the relative interior ri(C) of a nonempty convex set C ⊂ RK is the nonempty
interior of C for the topology relative to the affine hull aff(C) [22, p. 103]. We prove that any a ∈ ri
(
FA(q)
)
answers
the question. Let a ∈ ri
(
FA(q)
)
be fixed. For any q 6∈ ∆cA(p¯), by (44a) we have that FA(p¯) 6⊂ FA(q). Therefore, there
exists a¯ ∈ FA(p¯) such that a¯ 6∈ FA(q), that is, such that σA(q) > 〈q , a¯〉. As a ∈ ri
(
FA(q)
)
, there exists a′ ∈ ri
(
FA(q)
)
such that a = λa′+(1−λ)a¯ for a certain λ ∈]0, 1[. Since σA(q) ≥ 〈q , a
′〉 (by definition (24) of σA) and σA(q) > 〈q , a¯〉
(as a¯ 6∈ FA(q)), we deduce that σA(q) = λσA(q)+ (1−λ)σA(q) > λ 〈q , a
′〉+(1−λ) 〈q , a¯〉 = 〈q , a〉, where we used the
property that λ ∈]0, 1[. Using the definition (45) of the function ϕa, we have obtained that q 6∈ ∆
c
A(p¯)⇒ ϕa(q) > 0.
This ends the proof. ✷
A.3.2 Undecided
Proof.[Proof of Theorem 5]
We prove the three inequalities in (12).
A). We prove the upper inequality CAE ‖q − p¯‖ ≥ VoIA(q) in (12).
By definition (24) of a support function, we have that σA(·) ≤ ‖A‖×‖ · ‖, where ‖A‖ = sup{‖a‖ , a ∈ A} < +∞.
Thus CA = ‖A‖ in the left hand side inequality in (12).
B). We prove the middle inequality VoIA(q) ≥ VoIA⋆(p¯)(q) in (12).
For all s ∈ Σ, we have that
σA(s)− σA(p¯) ≥σFA(p¯)(s− p¯) by (27) since FA(p¯) 6= ∅ (53a)
= 〈s− p¯ , a〉 , ∀a ∈ FA(p¯) by definition of σFA(p¯) (53b)
=σFA(p¯)(s)− σFA(p¯)(p¯) by definition of σFA(p¯). (53c)
By taking the expectation E , we obtain that
VoIA(q) =E [σA(q)− σA(p¯)] by (6) and (25) (54a)
≥E
[
σFA(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
by (53a) (54b)
=E
[
σFA(p¯)(q)− σFA(p¯)(p¯)
]
by (53c) (54c)
=VoIFA(p¯)(q) by (6) and (25).
This ends the proof of the middle inequality.
C). We prove the right hand side inequality VoIA⋆(p¯)(q) ≥ E ‖q− p¯‖Σi
A
(p¯) in (12).
Let n be the dimension of the affine hull aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
of FA(p¯), and let a1, . . . , an be n actions in FA(p¯) that
generate aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
. We put
T = {a1, . . . , an} ⊂ FA(p¯) so that aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
= aff{a1, . . . , an} = aff(T ) . (55)
We will now show that ‖ · ‖Σi
A
(p¯) =
1
n
σT−T (·) is a semi-norm with kernel (FA(p¯) − FA(p¯))
⊥ that satisfies the right
hand side inequality in (12).
21
First, the support function σT−T is a semi-norm with kernel (T − T )
⊥, as easily seen. Now, we also easily see
that, for any subset S ⊂ RK , one has (S − S)⊥ =
(
aff(S − S)
)⊥
=
(
aff(S) − aff(S)
)⊥
. Using these equalities with
S = T and S = FA(p¯), we deduce that (T − T )
⊥ = (FA(p¯) − FA(p¯))
⊥, since aff(T ) = aff
(
FA(p¯)
)
by (55). Second,
we show that the right hand side inequality in (12) is satisfied. We have
VoIA(q) ≥ E
[
σFA(p¯)(q− p¯)
]
by (54b)
≥ E [σT (q− p¯)]
(because T ⊂ FA(p¯) and support functions (24) are monotone with respect to set inclusion)
= E [σT (q− p¯)− 〈q− p¯ , a〉] , ∀a ∈ A because E [〈q− p¯ , a〉] = 0.
= E [σT−a(q− p¯)] , ∀a ∈ A because σT−a = σT+{−a} = σT + σ{−a}.
Indeed, support functions transform a Minkowski sum of sets into a sum of support functions [22, p. 226]. Using
again this property, we obtain that VoIA(q) ≥
1
n
∑n
i=1 E [σT−ai(q− p¯)] =
1
n
E
[
σ∑n
i=1
(T−ai)(q− p¯)
]
. Now, as
T = {a1, . . . , an}, it is easy to see that the sum
∑n
i=1(T − ai) contains any element of the form ak − al = (a1 −
a1) + · · · + (al−1 − al−1) + (ak − al) + (al+1 − al+1) + · · · + (an − an) ∈
∑n
i=1(T − ai). As support functions
are monotone with respect to set inclusion, we deduce that σ∑n
i=1
(T−ai) ≥ σ{ak−al,k,l=1,...,n} = σT−T and that
VoIA(q) ≥
1
n
E
[
σ{ak−al,k,l=1,...,n}(q− p¯)
]
= 1
n
E [σT−T (q− p¯)] = E ‖q− p¯‖Σi
A
(p¯).
This ends the proof. ✷
A.3.3 Flexible
Proof.[Proof of Proposition 6]
All the reminders on geometric convex analysis in Sect. A.2 were done with outer normal vectors belonging to
the unit sphere of signed measures. Now, as we work with beliefs — positive measures of mass 1 — we are going to
adapt these concepts. We consider the diffeomorphism
ν : S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ → ∆ , s 7→
s
〈s , 1〉
, (57)
that maps unit positive measures into probability measures, with inverse ν−1 : ∆→ S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ , p 7→
p
‖p‖
.
Since, by assumption, the action set A has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold of RK , we know by Propo-
sition 15 that the spherical image map nA : ∂A → S
|K|−1 in (33) is well defined, is of class C1, and has for right
inverse the reverse spherical image map fA : regn(A)→ ∂A in (36), that is, nA ◦ fA = Idregn(A).
The set of relevant regular points is the subset of the set reg(A) of regular points defined by
a ∈ reg+(A) ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ ∆ , NA(a) = R+p . (58)
For a regular action a ∈ reg+(A), there is only one probability p ∈ ∆ such that NA(a) = R+p, and it is p = ν
(
nA(a)
)
.
We have a ∈ reg+(A) ⇒ NA(a) = R+ν
(
nA(a)
)
where ν
(
nA(a)
)
∈ ∆. The set of regular probabilities is regn+(A) =(
R
∗
+regn(A)
)
∩∆. For a regular probability p ∈ regn+(A), there is only one action a ∈ ∂A such that FA(p) = {a},
and it is a = fA
(
ν−1(p)
)
. Indeed, by definition (26) of the (exposed) face, we have that FA(λs) = FA(s) , ∀λ ∈
R
∗
+ , ∀s ∈ Σ , s 6= 0. Therefore, we have that
p ∈ regn+(A)⇒ FA(p) = {fA
(
ν−1(p)
)
} . (59)
The following mappings are well defined: ν ◦ nA : reg
+(A) → ∆ and fA ◦ ν
−1 : regn+(A) → ∂A, and we have that
(ν ◦ nA) ◦ (fA ◦ ν
−1) = Idregn+(A).
• Item 2 ⇒ Item 1.
Suppose that the face FA(p¯) is a singleton {a
♯} and the curvature of the boundary ∂A of payoffs at a♯ is positive.
Since, by assumption, the action set A has boundary ∂A which is a C2 submanifold of RK , we know that the
spherical image map nA in (33) is defined over the whole boundary ∂A and is of class C
1, and its differential
is the Weingarten map. As the curvature of the boundary ∂A of payoffs at a♯ is positive, the Weingarten
map Ta♯nA is of maximal rank at a
♯ [34, p. 115]. Therefore, by the inverse function theorem, there exists an
open neighborhood A of a♯ in A such that nA(A) is an open neighborhood of nA
(
a♯
)
in S|K|−1, and such
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that the restriction nA : A → nA(A) of the spherical image map in (33) is a diffeomorphism. By item iii) in
Proposition 15, we have that nA
(
a♯
)
= p¯
‖p¯‖
and the local inverse coincides with the restriction fA : nA(A)→ A
of the reverse spherical image map in (36). As nA(A) is an open neighborhood of
p¯
‖p¯‖
in S|K|−1, and as
the prior belief p¯ has full support, we deduce that ν
(
nA(A)
)
is an open neighborhood of p¯ in ∆, where the
diffeomorphism ν is defined in (57). We easily deduce that fA ◦ ν
−1 : ν
(
nA(A)
)
→ A is a diffeomorphism.
By (59), we conclude that fA ◦ν
−1 is the restriction of the set-valued mapping FA : ∆⇒ A, p 7→ FA(p) in (13).
• Item 1 ⇒ Item 3.
Suppose that the set-valued mapping FA : ∆ ⇒ A, p 7→ FA(p) in (13) is a local diffeomorphism at p¯. By
definition (35) of the set of regular unit signed measures, there exists an open neighborhood ∐ of p¯ in ∆ such
that ∐ ⊂ regn+(A), where the set of relevant regular points is defined in (58). In addition, the mapping
fA ◦ ν
−1 : ∐ → fA
(
ν−1(∐)
)
is a diffeomorphism.
As FA(p) = {fA
(
ν−1(p)
)
}, for all beliefs p ∈ ∐, we know that the support function σA is differentiable and
that its derivative is ∇pσA = fA
(
ν−1(p)
)
[22, p. 251]. As fA ◦ ν
−1 is a local diffeomorphism at p¯, and as the
mapping ν in (57) is a diffeomorphism, we deduce that the support function σA is twice differentiable with
Hessian having full rank. As the value function vA is the restriction of σA to ∆, we conclude that vA is twice
differentiable at p¯ and the Hessian is positive definite.
• Item 3 ⇒ Item 2.
Suppose that the value function vA is twice differentiable at p¯ and the Hessian is positive definite.
On the one hand, as the prior p¯ has full support, there exists an open neighborhood ∐ of p¯ in ∆ such that vA
is differentiable on ∐. On the other hand, as the support function σA is positively homogeneous, and by (25),
we have that
σA(s) = 〈s , 1〉 ×
(
vA ◦ ν
)
(s) , ∀s ∈ S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ . (60)
Therefore, as the mapping ν in (57) is a diffeomorphism, the support function σA is differentiable on the open
neighborhood ν−1(∐) of ν−1(p¯) = p¯
‖p¯‖
in S|K|−1 ∩ RK+ .
Since, on the one hand, a convex function with domain RK is differentiable at s if and only if the subdifferential
at s is a singleton [22, p. 251], and, on the other hand, the face FA(s) is the subdifferential at s of the support
function σA [22, p. 258], we conclude that the face FA(s) of A in the direction s ∈ ν
−1(∐) is a singleton.
Therefore, by definition (35) of the set of regular unit signed measures, we have that ν−1(∐) ⊂ regn(A). In
addition, the restriction fA : ν
−1(∐)→ fA
(
ν−1(∐)
)
of the reverse spherical image map in (36) is well defined,
and we have that ∇sσA = fA(s) , ∀s ∈ ν
−1(∐). Therefore, the mapping fA : ν
−1(∐) → fA
(
ν−1(∐)
)
is
differentiable at ν−1(p¯) = p¯
‖p¯‖
, and has full rank. Indeed, σA is twice differentiable at ν
−1(p¯) = p¯
‖p¯‖
, and the
Hessian is positive definite. This comes from (60), where the mapping ν in (57) is a C∞ diffeomorphism and
the value function vA is twice differentiable at p¯ with positive definite Hessian.
As fA is is differentiable at
p¯
‖p¯‖
and has full rank, the reverse Weingarten map TsfA in (38) is well defined and
has full rank. Therefore, the principal radii of curvature of A at p¯
‖p¯‖
are positive. Letting a♯ = fA
(
p¯
‖p¯‖
)
, we
conclude that FA(p¯) = {a
♯} and that the curvature of the boundary ∂A of payoffs at a♯ is positive.
This ends the proof. ✷
Proof.[Proof of Theorem 7]
We suppose that the value function vA in (2) is twice differentiable at p¯, with positive definite Hessian. We denote
FA(p¯) = {a
♯}.
First, we show that the function g(p) =
vA(p)−vA(p¯)−〈p−p¯ ,a♯〉
‖p−p¯‖2
is continuous and positive on ∆. Indeed, g is
continuous on ∆\{p¯}, and also at p¯ since the value function vA is twice differentiable at p¯. In addition, g(p¯) > 0 since
the Hessian of vA at p¯ is positive definite. We have g ≥ 0 on ∆\{p¯}, because FA(p¯) = {a
♯} is the subdifferential at p¯
of the support function σA, and by (25). We now prove by contradiction that g > 0. If there existed a belief p 6= p¯
such that g(p) = 0, we would have vA(p)− vA(p¯)−
〈
p− p¯ , a♯
〉
= 0; this equality would then hold true over the whole
segment [p, p¯], and we would conclude that the second derivative of vA at p¯ along the (nonzero) direction p− p¯ would
be zero; this would contradict the assumption that the Hessian of vA at p¯ is positive definite. Therefore, we conclude
that g > 0. Second, letting Cp¯,A > 0 and cp¯,A > 0 be the maximum and the minimum of the function g > 0 on the
compact set ∆, we easily deduce (14) from (6).
This ends the proof. ✷
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